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2 June 1960

Memorandum for Mr. Amory

Subject: Notes []

1. Abbott Smith passed on to me the problem of preparing some notes for [] use in dealing with [] on the U-2 program.

2. I am afraid I am not wholly clear regarding [] needs, but it occurred to me that some refurbishing of my notes to you regarding the use of U-2-gathered intelligence in estimates might do the trick. In particular, I have assumed that [] needs a paper he can understand and talk from and that he does not need a lot of technical references or a sanitized document for passing on []

3. The re-do is attached.

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We have been concerned for many years about Soviet capabilities to attack the United States. We have been concerned not only with what these capabilities are today, but with what they are likely to be two, three, or five years in the future. This means that we want to know what weapons systems the Soviet leaders are planning for the future to frustrate our own deterrent capability and to create and improve their strategic capability. We need further to determine, if possible, what their intentions and doctrines are with respect to the use of their capabilities. In other words, are they trying to develop a minimal deterrent capability, a considerably larger -- but not necessarily decisive -- strike capability, or are they trying to build a really large and formidable capability with which to frighten the West into submission or alternatively to destroy the West -- including the West's retaliatory force?

Our estimates on these matters are based upon information from a variety of sources and upon careful analytical work. We have used aerial photography in some of these estimates. There are some matters in which aerial photography is very helpful and some matters in which it is of little direct value.

In the field of Soviet air defense capabilities we have been concerned with the development of Soviet surface-to-air missile systems, because the effectiveness of our deterrent capability depends in large degree upon whether the Soviet leaders believe our strategic air force

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